The Turkish people went to ballot boxes last Sunday to vote on the constitutional changes. With more than 51 percent of the people approving the changes, Turkey has entered a new era.
I wrote in my last column that the outcome of the constitutional referendum can have a special effect on the Syrian issue. Apart from the government’s pledge that tens of thousands of Syrians taking shelter in Turkey may be granted Turkish citizenship, the Turkish military could expand its operation on Syrian soil in the case of a “Yes” triumph.
Now that the “Yes” votes have prevailed on the night of April 16, it is time to meticulously assess what options the Turkish government has with regards to its military activities on the Syrian soil.
The Turkish military entered into Syria on Aug. 24, 2016, in cooperation with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), to clear its southern border and eradicate ISIS along the way. Seven months into the offensive, the Turkish military-backed FSA liberated some ISIS strongholds such as Jarabulus, Dabiq and al-Bab.
Having taken full control of al-Bab, the Turkish government and the military announced that Operation Euphrates Shield was successfully concluded. However, we already know that Ankara plans to launch new offensives in the region against the PKK’s Syrian affiliate Democratic Union Party’s (PYD) armed wing, People’s Protection Units (YPG).
Two PYD-held areas stand out as possible targets for Ankara. Turkish authorities have already made their intention known to capture PYD-held Afrin and Manbij. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said earlier this month that Turkey was preparing for new cross-border operations elsewhere in the region against terrorist groups after completing the first stage of Operation Euphrates Shield.
That being said, even though Ankara is adamant on eradicating the PYD dominance within Syria to prevent the group from establishing a terrorist state, foreign actors play a key role in the region. Both Washington and the Kremlin favor the YPG on the ground and have sided with the terrorist group on different occasions.
Despite my assertion that it is high time for Ankara to take further steps in Syria following the referendum, the United States and the Russian Federation had protected the YPG in March. It is still a strong sign that the two foreign actors will not easily let Ankara crush the YPG in Afrin and Manbij.
Ankara needs to persuade both countries that the YPG is not a reliable partner on the ground and it purses its own goal of establishing an independent state within Syria, which is against the declared goals of the U.S. and Russia.
In fact, the Turkish government needs to offer leaders of both countries, namely Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, reasonable plans that will exclude the YPG. Turkey’s offer to the U.S. to carry out ground operations with the FSA instead of the YPG has failed to persuade American authorities.
For Turkey, it could come down to put Turkish boots on the ground while defeating ISIS to convince the U.S. and Russia to give up on their insistence on the YPG. Time will tell if Ankara will be able to convince the two countries to strike the YPG or Erdoğan will defy them to eliminate the terrorist group in Syria
