Amir Hakouk | Rkkan al-Khder | Mohammed Jaffal
The Middle East is witnessing an unprecedented phase of escalation as the scope of military confrontation expands between Iran on one side and the United States and Israel on the other. The conflict is no longer confined to the borders of the warring parties, its repercussions are now extending across several countries in the region.
At the heart of this tense geography stands Syria, which once again finds itself facing complex challenges imposed by a highly intricate regional environment.
Although Damascus is trying to avoid direct involvement in the conflict, its geographic location, intertwined borders with Lebanon and Iraq, and the legacy of years of regional influence and internal conflict expose it to growing security, political, and economic repercussions.
In this report, Enab Baladi examines the impact of the military confrontation between Israel and Iran on Syria from three angles. The first is the security landscape and the risks it poses, the second is Syria’s political scene amid these shifts and the government’s political response, and the third is the economic fallout on an economy that has yet to recover.
Security risks facing Syria
The security repercussions of the regional military confrontation between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other do not appear distant from Syria, which sits at the center of this confrontation.
The escalation has caused security turmoil across several Middle Eastern countries, and Syria is no exception. Israeli warplanes continue to cross Syrian airspace, while many Iranian missiles and drones fall inside Syrian territory after being intercepted by Israeli air defenses.
In addition, armed groups affiliated with Iran along Syria’s borders with Lebanon and Iraq pose further security pressure on Damascus, prompting the Syrian government to take precautionary measures to shield itself from the consequences of the ongoing war in the region.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu launched the “Roar of the Lion” operation against Iran on February 28, aiming to eliminate what he described as the existential threat posed by what he called the “terrorist regime” in Iran.
The US president also announced the start of “major combat operations” in Iran, stating that the objective is to protect the American people by eliminating imminent threats posed by the Iranian regime.
Iran responded militarily by targeting several military sites in Israel and US bases in Gulf countries.
An Israeli airstrike on a building in southern Lebanon, March 13, 2026 (AFP)
Precautionary measures to control the borders
The Syrian army has reinforced its deployment along the borders with Lebanon and Iraq, in what it said was aimed at monitoring border activity and combating smuggling, amid regional escalation and Israeli airstrikes that expanded into Lebanon after Lebanon’s Hezbollah resumed rocket fire on Israel on March 2. Israel responded with airstrikes on several Lebanese areas in the south, Beirut’s southern suburbs, and the Bekaa Valley.
Ammar Jello, a researcher at the Dialogue Center for Research and Studies in Washington, believes Syria’s security concerns are significant, particularly over the possibility of border infiltration or the positioning of Iran-affiliated groups near Syrian territory, given the heavy cost such a scenario could impose on the Syrian state through airstrikes for which Israel would then find justification.
He also pointed to another concern, the possibility of rebuilding a logistical and military supply corridor to Hezbollah via Syrian territory, placing Syria in a position it does not want.
According to Jello, the Syrian government has adopted neutrality as the best option, given that the war is between two parties hostile to Damascus. He also pointed to the possibility of these factions entering Syrian territory and exploiting the still fragile security situation if the war expands.
For his part, Moataz al-Sayed, a researcher at the Syrian Center for Security and Defense Studies, said the intensified military deployment along the borders is a precautionary measure amid regional tensions, aimed at preventing armed groups from using Syrian territory as a platform to attack Israel, or the infiltration of Hezbollah cells or some Iraqi groups linked to Iran.
Al-Sayed added that such movements could drag Syria into a conflict it does not want to join, which is why Damascus is seeking to tighten control over its borders and prevent any unchecked military activity.
He said the Syrian move is natural for any state under such circumstances, as governments usually tighten border surveillance during regional crises to avoid tensions spilling into their territory.
“We support Lebanon’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah, at a time when Lebanese President Joseph Aoun has proposed an initiative to address weapons outside the framework of the state. Syrian authorities have reinforced the deployment of their defensive forces along the border as a precaution, with the aim of preventing the conflict’s repercussions from spilling into Syrian territory, combating cross-border groups, and preventing them from using Syrian land.”
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa
A displacement crisis with security risks
Israel issued evacuation orders covering most of southern Lebanon, leading to the displacement of tens of thousands. The number of displaced people due to the military confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah rose to more than 800,000 between the start of military operations on March 2 and March 12, according to Lebanon’s Disaster Risk Management Unit.
This raises the prospect of a large wave of displacement toward the Syrian border, especially given that more than one million Syrians are inside Lebanon, while Syria represents Lebanon’s only land outlet to the outside world.
Researcher Ammar Jello said the Syrian state is not capable of absorbing returning Syrian refugees, whether in terms of infrastructure or weak service conditions. In his view, the more dangerous possibility lies in Hezbollah members entering among the refugees in order to carry out operations and establish a land corridor through Syrian territory, which would threaten Syrian state security and reshuffle the Syrian scene once again.
Meanwhile, Moataz al-Sayed suggested that the Syrian government may move to regulate entry through official crossings and prevent smuggling if a displacement crisis from Lebanon occurs, while directing displaced people toward specific areas to avoid friction with local residents.
He pointed to social sensitivities among some Syrians who believe Lebanon previously mistreated Syrian refugees, which could create internal tensions if the issue is not managed carefully.
“The entry of some Hezbollah-affiliated individuals among the refugees, with the aim of carrying out operations and establishing a land corridor through Syrian territory, would threaten state security and reshuffle the Syrian scene once again.”
Ammar Jello
Researcher at the Dialogue Center for Research and Studies in Washington
Hezbollah’s motives in targeting Syria
On March 10, the Syrian army’s Operations Directorate announced that artillery shells had landed on Syrian territory near the town of Serghaya (west of Damascus, southwestern Syria), fired from Lebanese territory.
In a statement to the Syrian state news agency SANA, the Directorate accused Lebanon’s Hezbollah of being behind the shelling toward Syrian army positions near Serghaya.
It added that it had monitored Hezbollah reinforcements arriving at the Syrian-Lebanese border, noting that it was monitoring and assessing the situation, communicating with the Lebanese army, and studying appropriate options to do “what is necessary,” without clarifying what those options were.
The Directorate also said the Syrian army “will not tolerate any aggression targeting Syria.”
In this context, researcher Moataz al-Sayed believes Hezbollah’s targeting of Syrian territory can be understood in light of the recent military escalation in the region, especially after the areas that came under shelling had witnessed an Israeli military operation in the Serghaya plain targeting sites linked to the group on the Lebanese side, which may have prompted Hezbollah to carry out a retaliatory strike inside Syrian territory rather than a calculated military move.
At the same time, according to al-Sayed, the objective may have been an attempt by the group to shift part of the tension to the Syrian arena, especially amid the major pressure it faces in Lebanon, including repeated Israeli strikes, the displacement of hundreds of thousands from southern Lebanon, and the political crisis following the announcement of a ban on its activities there. He said Hezbollah may be seeking to spread tension to new areas in order to ease pressure at home or reshuffle the regional landscape.
“Amid the growing pressure it faces in Lebanon, Hezbollah is trying to spread tension to new areas in order to ease domestic pressure or reshuffle the regional landscape.”
Moataz al-Sayed
Researcher at the Syrian Center for Security and Defense Studies
For his part, Ammar Jello believes Hezbollah’s motives in targeting Syrian territory are most likely to test the Syrian government’s neutrality in the regional war and gauge how serious the Syrian state is about that stance.
Jello said the move may have been a “malicious operation” by Hezbollah aimed at pushing the Syrian government to respond and reshuffle the cards in Syria and the region as a whole. He argued that any military action against the group that leads to Syrian involvement on Lebanese territory would contribute to reshaping the Lebanese scene, whether among Hezbollah supporters or its opponents.
Syrian involvement in a military operation in Lebanon would be highly sensitive, due to what Jello described as the negative historical memory of Syrian intervention during the Lebanese civil war, in addition to the possibility that the Syrian government could become a victim of regional and international alignments if it intervenes in Lebanon.
Calculated responses and narrow options
Researcher Moataz al-Sayed said the Syrian response to Hezbollah appears measured and limited so far. Syrian forces responded directly to the sources of fire to contain the incident in the field, while Damascus also conducted several contacts with Lebanese leaders to address the issue through political and security channels, indicating that Syria does not want to escalate the situation.
Al-Sayed ruled out the possibility of Syria moving toward a broader confrontation, suggesting that the government will likely limit itself to controlling the situation on the ground and stressing that its territory must not be used in any military escalation that could drag it into a conflict it does not want.
“Damascus understands the nature of Hezbollah’s move and realizes that what happened is closer to demonstrative strikes or limited responses linked to the regional escalation.”
Moataz al-Sayed
Researcher at the Syrian Center for Security and Defense Studies
Pressuring Lebanon
Ammar Jello believes the options available to Damascus will be limited to pressuring the Lebanese government to prevent Hezbollah from repeating such actions, making them narrow and constrained options.
The Lebanese government is already incapable of curbing Hezbollah, and if it had been able to disarm the group, it would have done so long ago, Jello said.
He added that another option for the Syrian government would be to increase coordination with Lebanese military and security institutions to prevent such operations and exert joint efforts to confront them.
An Iranian drone crashed in the village of Ain al-Beida in Quneitra countryside (southern Syria) after being intercepted by Israeli defenses, March 10, 2026 (al-Ikhbariya)
Politically
Avoiding involvement in regional conflict, strengthening ties with the Arab sphere
As the confrontation between the two sides of the conflict intensifies, Syria is trying to manage its position within a highly sensitive regional environment, especially after the major political shift the country witnessed following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in late 2024 and the formation of a new government led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa.
This political transition has been accompanied by a clear shift in Syria’s foreign policy orientation. Damascus has ended its relations with Iran, while strengthening ties with Arab countries, particularly Gulf states.
In light of these developments, questions arise about how Syria is positioning itself amid the ongoing regional conflict and the political efforts it is making to avoid its repercussions.
A shift in Syria’s regional position
Mohammed al-Yamani, a researcher in international relations, believes that the political transformation Syria has undergone since 2024 has significantly changed how regional actors perceive Damascus’s stance on the war.
After years of being viewed as part of Iran’s sphere of influence in the region, Syria is now attempting to present itself as part of an Arab environment seeking to contain the conflict and prevent its expansion.
Al-Yamani noted that this shift is also linked to the transitional phase the country is experiencing, prompting the Syrian leadership to prioritize maintaining internal stability and preventing the spillover of war into Syrian territory.
For his part, Syrian journalist and researcher Subhi Franjie described this approach as a form of “positive neutrality.” Damascus is trying to avoid direct involvement in the war while affirming its support for Arab states that have been targeted by Iranian attacks, and at the same time working to prevent Syrian territory from being used in any military operations related to the conflict.
“Damascus’s approach to avoid direct involvement in the war can be described as a form of ‘positive neutrality.’”
Subhi Franjie
Syrian journalist and researcher
Rapprochement with Gulf states and Arab repositioning
Iran has launched missile attacks on Gulf countries targeting US bases located there, following the announcement by the United States and Israel of large-scale strikes on Iran.
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa intensified phone calls with several Gulf leaders, including those of Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, affirming Syria’s full solidarity with “brotherly countries” in the face of any attacks on their sovereignty and security.
Researcher Mohammed al-Yamani considers the rapprochement between Syria and several Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, to be one of the most prominent features of Syria’s regional repositioning.
According to him, Damascus is seeking to strengthen its presence within the Arab political sphere and reintegrate itself into its regional environment after years of political isolation.
He believes this rapprochement may push Syria to adopt political rhetoric closer to Arab positions in the current crisis, particularly amid rising tensions between Iran and several Arab countries, while Damascus continues to pursue a cautious policy aimed at preventing the conflict from spilling into its territory.
“Damascus’s rapprochement with its Arab surroundings is pushing it to adopt political rhetoric closer to Arab positions.”
Mohammed al-Yamani
Researcher in international relations
Franjie, in turn, believes that this openness toward Gulf states reflects a significant shift in Syria’s perception of its regional role. According to him, Damascus now sees itself as part of the broader Arab position in facing regional challenges, despite its limited capabilities and its sensitive geographic position between Iran and Lebanon.
Syrian political engagement with Lebanon
Regarding Lebanon, President al-Sharaa held several calls with Lebanese political figures, including Walid Jumblatt and Samy Gemayel.
Al-Yamani believes these contacts reflect Syria’s awareness of the sensitivity of the situation in Lebanon, which could become a theater of escalation if the regional war expands.
He suggests that through this communication, Damascus aims to support stability in Lebanon and prevent the country from sliding into a wider confrontation that could directly impact Syria, whether through border security repercussions or potential waves of displacement.
Meanwhile, Subhi Franjie believes these contacts also serve to reaffirm Syria’s rejection of using its territory for any military activity linked to the conflict, as well as its efforts to contain the war’s repercussions and prevent them from extending into Lebanon or Syrian borders.
Coordination with Iraq and border control
According to al-Yamani, Syria’s political outreach is not limited to Lebanon, but also extends to Iraq, where Damascus is working to enhance communication with the federal government in Baghdad and with the leadership of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
This engagement, he said, aims to strengthen political and security coordination between neighboring countries and prevent shared borders from becoming corridors for escalating the conflict.
Franjie added that the Syrian government has already intensified communication with Iraqi actors, alongside sending military reinforcements to border areas, in an effort to prevent Syrian borders from being used as routes to support Iran-linked militias.
He also noted that Syrian authorities are working to control the borders with Lebanon and Iraq, prevent arms smuggling, and stop Syrian territory from being used as a supply line for Hezbollah or other Iran-linked armed groups.
Internal security challenges
Despite these regional efforts, several internal security challenges continue to shape the Syrian government’s policies.
Franjie highlighted key challenges, including the relationship with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the complexities of the situation in Suwayda (southern Syria), and threats posed by the Islamic State group and its attempts to reactivate its cells.
He believes these conditions make internal stability the top priority for Damascus, explaining its insistence on preventing the war from spilling into its territory.
“The presence of internal security challenges pushes Damascus to prioritize internal stability, which explains its efforts to prevent the war from spilling into its territory.”
Subhi Franjie
Syrian researcher
Limits of Syria’s influence on the conflict
Al-Yamani concludes that Syria’s diplomatic efforts with Lebanon and Iraq may help reduce the likelihood of the confrontation spreading to neighboring countries, but their impact remains limited given the complex nature of the conflict, in which regional and international factors are deeply intertwined.
In contrast, Franjie believes these efforts carry a clear political message, that Syria seeks to solidify its position within the Arab sphere, while simultaneously focusing on managing its internal challenges.
Buildings destroyed in Tehran following an Israeli airstrike, March 12, 2026 (Reuters)
Economic repercussions strain Syria’s fragile economy
The repercussions of the war between Iran and Israel are no longer limited to the security or political dimensions of the international scene, as their economic impacts have begun to emerge clearly across countries in the region.
As the scope of military confrontation in the Middle East expands, Syria stands out as one of the countries most affected by the geopolitical and economic shifts resulting from the war. Its economy, which has yet to recover from more than a decade of internal conflict, now faces new pressures that further complicate living conditions.
An external shock hits a fragile economy
In this context, questions arise about the direct and indirect economic impacts of this war on Syria’s domestic situation.
Benjamin Fève, senior researcher and analyst at Karam Shaar Advisory, believes that even if Syria remains outside direct military confrontation, it will be affected economically through three main channels:
- Rising global energy prices
- Disruptions to trade and supply chains
- A decline in foreign investment and aid, particularly from Gulf countries, which represent a key source of funding and investment in Syria
In his view, these factors could slow the fragile economic recovery and increase pressure on prices and the public budget.
Economist and university professor Dr. Abdulrahman Mohammad described the impact of the Iran-Israel war on Syria as a “cumulative effect of an external shock on a fragile economy.”
He agrees with Fève that Syria is not a direct party to the war as much as it is an arena affected by its outcomes, likening the Syrian economy to a patient with a chronic illness exposed to a new shock that disrupts its vital functions.
He pointed out that one of the most prominent effects is the deepening of economic stagnation, as commercial and industrial activities decline in areas close to tension lines or exposed to bombardment.
This is accompanied by an accelerating depreciation of the Syrian pound due to increased demand for foreign currencies.
Global energy prices and their impact on the Syrian market
Energy markets are among the sectors most sensitive to regional conflicts, as oil and gas prices are closely linked to stability in production areas and supply routes, especially after Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, through which around 20% of global energy exports pass.
Dr. Abdulrahman Mohammad noted that the war’s impact on global energy prices is primarily linked to fears of escalation rather than actual disruptions in production.
However, for Syria, the impact is magnified. According to him, Syria relies heavily on importing refined petroleum products such as diesel and gasoline, making it more vulnerable to any rise in global prices.
He added that the war may also complicate supply routes, especially if ports or transport lines through Lebanon are affected, increasing logistical costs and placing additional pressure on the local market.
The economist estimates that a $30 increase in global oil prices could quickly be reflected in the Syrian market, where fuel prices on the black market could rise by between 20% and 35%, due to fragile supply chains and insufficient subsidies.
“Syria relies heavily on importing petroleum derivatives, making it more vulnerable, and fuel prices on the black market could rise by between 20% and 35%.”
Abdulrahman Mohammad
Economist and university professor
Fève shares this view, noting that for Syria, which partially depends on external supplies and already suffers from a weak energy sector, any global increase may translate into noticeable rises in energy costs and fewer hours of electricity supply.
He expects actual cost increases to range between about 10% and 25% if escalation continues for several weeks.
Buildings destroyed in Tehran following an Israeli airstrike, March 12, 2026 (Reuters)
Economic sectors under pressure, energy at the forefront
With the expansion of regional tensions, several economic sectors in Syria are directly or indirectly affected, which is reflected in prices and living standards.
Benjamin Fève said the most affected sectors include energy and electricity, food and agriculture, transport and trade, as well as investment and major projects.
He added that rising fuel and transportation costs directly affect commodity prices and agricultural production, while some foreign investments may hesitate amid regional instability.
He stressed the importance of prioritizing the provision of energy and essential goods, monitoring prices to prevent monopolies, and diversifying sources of imports and funding to reduce risks.
“The most affected sectors are energy and electricity, food and agriculture, transport and trade, in addition to investment and major projects.”
Benjamin Fève
Senior researcher and analyst at Karam Shaar Advisory
Imports and exports, hostage to border disruptions
Dr. Abdulrahman Mohammad confirmed that the energy sector is among the most affected, along with trade, import, and export sectors, due to the closure of some vital routes or disruptions in transport through borders and ports, leading to what amounts to a de facto restriction on imports.
The agricultural sector is also significantly affected, as rising fuel and fertilizer prices increase production costs, alongside difficulties in exporting products to traditional markets.
Meanwhile, the transport and logistics sector faces major challenges with the halt of many trucks and rising transport costs, which directly impacts prices in local markets.
To mitigate these effects, Dr. Abdulrahman Mohammad proposed:
- Providing direct logistical support for transporting essential food and medical supplies
- Encouraging local production by supporting farmers and industrialists to compensate for shortages in imported goods
“The closure of certain routes or disruptions in shipping movement usually lead to higher prices due to increased transport and insurance costs and delays in deliveries, which may cause temporary shortages of some goods. In the Syrian case, where a large part of the market depends on imports, these disruptions could push prices even higher, especially if they coincide with rising fuel prices and weak purchasing power.”
Benjamin Fève
Senior researcher and analyst at Karam Shaar Advisory
Displacement from Lebanon and its economic impact on Syria
Among the indirect consequences of the war is rising tension in Lebanon and the start of new displacement waves toward Syria, whether among Syrians residing in Lebanon or some Lebanese nationals.
Dr. Abdulrahman Mohammad believes this phenomenon can be understood economically as a transfer of economic and human burdens from Lebanon to Syria.
He said that the sudden return of large numbers of people may place additional pressure on public services and infrastructure, especially in areas receiving newcomers, such as Rural Damascus (southwestern Syria), Homs (central Syria), and border regions.
An increase in population also raises demand for basic goods, housing, and services, which may push prices higher and increase inflation rates in local markets.
Activity in some sectors, pressure on others
Benjamin Fève expects that the return of some Syrians from Lebanon or the arrival of some Lebanese in Syria may stimulate certain local economic activities in the short term, such as rentals and consumption.
However, it would simultaneously increase pressure on public services, the labor market, and infrastructure in a country already suffering from limited resources.
If this wave continues, it could lead to increased demand for food, energy, and humanitarian aid at a time when the Syrian economy is already under significant strain.
The Syrian General Authority for Ports and Customs revealed that 65,000 Syrians have returned from Lebanon since the beginning of March, following the recent Israeli escalation on Lebanon.
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