Mowaffak al-Khouja | Mohammed Jaffal | Shaaban Shamieh
The United States is trying to rein in the Russian bear by breaking its influence in its new ally, Syria, which, following a radical political change, has shifted from the eastern camp to a state balancing East and West, with clear closeness to the West, which still seeks to bring it under its wing.
This theory is reinforced by amendments made to the Pentagon budget after the US House Armed Services Committee approved them on June 5. The amendments included plans to limit Russian influence in Syria or remove it, while assessing the potential risks it poses to Washington.
These amendments are tied to deeper and broader files involving Washington’s relations with Arab states, especially Gulf states, its influence in the region, the Iranian war, and efforts to confront China’s dominance.
Moscow, for its part, is seeking to preserve its lungs and its last strongholds inside the Middle East by playing on balances and trying to persuade yesterday’s enemy, today’s friend, after the losses it suffered following the fall of the Assad regime.
Damascus, meanwhile, stands between two global poles, trying to hold the stick from the middle and lean toward its own interests without disrupting this balance or violating Western wishes. It holds negotiation files that put the Syrian government under observers’ scrutiny, as they assess its ability to maneuver using those files.
Hmeimim and Tartus Port
Russia Defends Its Breathing Space in the Middle East
The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime was not merely a political shift inside Syria. It also marked a turning point in the trajectory of Russian influence, which had been entrenched since Moscow’s direct military intervention in 2015.
Moscow entered the Syrian war as the most prominent guarantor of the former regime’s survival, but found itself facing a different reality after the collapse of the ally that had provided it for years with political and military cover to expand its presence inside the country.
While Russia maintained its presence at the Hmeimim and Tartus bases, its priorities shifted from managing the Syrian conflict and influencing political decision-making to protecting what remained of its strategic gains, amid domestic and regional changes that made the continuation of its influence more complicated than ever.
Russian soldiers stand beside military trucks ahead of the evacuation of a site in Qamishli, northeastern Syria, after the fall of the former regime, 12 December 2024 (AFP)
From Dominant Player to Seeker of Influence
With the fall of the regime, Moscow also lost the political environment that had allowed it to build broad influence inside Syrian state institutions.
Since 2015, Russia’s role had not been limited to managing military operations or protecting the former regime. It extended to influencing political, military, and economic decisions, benefiting from a close relationship with Damascus that made Moscow the most present external party in the Syrian file.
Writer and political researcher Hussein Omar believes the transformation that affected the Russian presence was radical. Moscow moved, he said, from “a dominant military mandate force that owned dozens of military sites and controlled strategic decision-making to a more cautious and shrinking presence now concentrated inside Hmeimim and Tartus.” He considered that Russia had thereby lost its role as “the political sponsor of the state” and had begun focusing on protecting its direct interests.
Political researcher Maher al-Tamran agrees with this view. He believes Russia moved from a phase in which its main goal was preventing the fall of the former regime to a new phase in which its priorities became tied more to protecting its strategic interests and regional influence than to defending a specific political authority.
According to al-Tamran, Moscow is now trying to adapt to a different reality based on managing influence and reducing the military and economic burdens imposed by years of war.
Dmitry Bridzhe, an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, said Russia lost “the model it relied on in Syria, based on the guaranteed ally, the closed state, and political decision-making that could be influenced through direct relations with the head of the regime.”
He added that Damascus now has a wider margin for maneuver and negotiation than in the previous phase.
What Did Moscow Lose With Assad’s Fall?
Political researcher Hussein Omar considers that Moscow’s greatest loss was losing “the guaranteed organic ally” that had provided Russia’s presence with almost absolute legal and sovereign cover. He added that Russia also lost the exclusive contracts it had obtained in vital sectors such as energy, phosphates, and ports.
Its ability to steer Syrian decision-making also declined from what it had been in previous years.
Omar believes that Moscow’s need to deal with a new Syrian administration seeking to diversify its foreign relations and open up to multiple parties effectively means the end of the era of Russian monopoly over the Syrian file.
Bridzhe said Russia had relied on a model based on direct relations with the head of power, which allowed it to influence major files through specific and clear channels. Today, however, it faces a new authority with a wider margin for maneuver and the ability to negotiate different terms for the Russian role to remain inside the country.
By contrast, Russia does not appear to be in the position of a total loser. According to Hussein Omar, Moscow still holds a set of leverage cards that make a complete rupture between it and Damascus difficult in the foreseeable future. These include the Syrian military institution’s reliance on Russian weapons and expertise, as well as continuing economic relations and some logistical and energy cooperation files.
Bridzhe goes further, considering that Russia can still play an influential role in files related to rebuilding military and security institutions and dealing with several internal and external challenges facing Syria at the current stage.
What is certain, however, is that Russia is no longer the sole or most influential player as it was during the war years. The equation governing relations between Moscow and Damascus has changed fundamentally, and for the first time since its military intervention, the Kremlin must defend its influence inside Syria instead of working to expand it.
“Russia moved from the stage of managing the Syrian war to the stage of managing its strategic interests in Syria, while seeking to preserve the power cards it accumulated over the past years.”
Maher al-Tamran
Writer and political researcher
Hmeimim and Tartus, The Last Cards of Russian Influence
If Moscow lost a large share of its political influence after Assad’s fall, the Hmeimim and Tartus bases now represent the core of the remaining Russian presence in Syria.
For the Kremlin, the two bases are not merely military facilities inside an allied state. They are part of a broader vision related to Russia’s international standing and its ability to preserve its influence in the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Africa.
Researcher Bridzhe considers Hmeimim and Tartus “the last two strategic lungs through which Moscow breathes in the eastern Mediterranean.” The first, in his assessment, gives Russia the ability to conduct air and logistical movement toward the Middle East and Africa, while the second represents the maritime gateway that guarantees Russia’s continued presence on the Mediterranean coast.
He added that the importance of the two bases goes beyond the Syrian file, touching Russia’s image as a major power capable of reaching warm waters and shaping balances beyond its immediate borders.
For his part, political researcher Maher al-Tamran believes that understanding Russian policy in the Middle East necessarily requires understanding the importance of these bases.
He considers that the two bases provide Russia not only with military advantages, but also with political and negotiating cards in regional files linked to energy, maritime navigation, and regional security.
The importance of the two bases has gained an additional dimension amid the shifts in Russian policy in recent years. With rising international competition and the expansion of Russian interests in Africa, Syria has become a link between Russian geography and the new zones of influence Moscow seeks to consolidate.
For this reason, the Russian leadership appears more determined to preserve its presence on the Syrian coast, even after losing the ally that had previously provided it with a broad political umbrella.
“Losing these two bases means ending Russia’s ambition to act as a global power beyond warm waters, and weakening its influence in the Middle East and Africa.”
Hussein Omar
Writer and political researcher
Resupply and Recent Moves, Russia Defends What Remains
Recently, repeated Russian movements have emerged on the Syrian coast, represented by resupply operations for the Hmeimim and Tartus bases, alongside logistical, air, and naval activity that drew observers’ attention.
While some observers interpreted these moves as an indication of strengthening the Russian presence, experts tend to view them as part of a process to reorganize the existing presence rather than a new expansion in military deployment.
Political researcher Maher al-Tamran believes current Russian activity focuses mainly on securing the bases and preserving their operational capacity. He explained that Moscow has moved from managing the Syrian war to managing its strategic interests in the country, and that the ongoing movements reflect a policy based on stabilizing influence, reducing cost, and keeping options open.
Hussein Omar takes a similar view, considering that what is happening is a “defensive retreat” aimed at gathering Russian capabilities inside a geographic area that is easier to protect after withdrawal from other sites, allowing Moscow to preserve influential negotiating cards in the coming phase.
Russian expert Dmitry Bridzhe reads the resupply operations as a political message as much as a logistical move. Moscow, according to him, seeks to confirm that Assad’s fall does not mean its exit from the Syrian equation.
He believes Russia is trying to redefine its presence inside Syria by moving from a role previously tied to protecting the regime to a role based on protecting Russian interests and preserving strategic partnerships.
“Russia today is not defending Assad as a person. It is defending its last cards in Syria, its last window onto the eastern Mediterranean, and its image as a major power that does not withdraw easily.”
Dmitry Bridzhe
Expert at the Russian International Affairs Council
Syrian President in the transitional phase Ahmed al-Sharaa alongside his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, 15 October 2025 (TASS)
Between Pentagon Tools and Damascus’s Conditions
Can Washington Reduce Russian Influence in Syria?
US military strategy on the ground is witnessing a radical shift, translated directly in the latest defense budget amendments.
This shift does not reflect merely a desire for modernization. According to observers, it indicates a comprehensive review of the failures of Washington and its allies in the Middle East and a redirection of the compass toward larger and more complex geopolitical conflicts.
The Pentagon Budget Draws the Features of a New Conflict
In an analytical reading of these shifts, the head of the Syria office at the Syrian American Council, Dr. Zaki Lababidi, told Enab Baladi that the “huge” financial amendments in the Pentagon budget are the direct result of a new field reality imposed after the military confrontation the United States fought with Iran, which, according to a realistic reading of strategic objectives, led to a clear American loss.
Lababidi also noted that doubling the military budget comes as a preemptive step to confront the decline of US influence in vital areas such as the Middle East and Europe, and even beyond, including preventing China from dominating Taiwan.
Through these financial measures, Washington is preparing for complex geopolitical scenarios, including the possibility that it may have to withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO. This would require the US military to be capable, on its own, of fighting and deciding major wars imposed by new international shifts.
Meanwhile, Dmitry Brijeh, an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, told Enab Baladi that the Pentagon budget amendments linked to Syria reflect the beginning of a new American phase aimed at reducing Russian influence and recalibrating the balance of power on the ground.
Brijeh added that Washington no longer deals with the Syrian file only from the angle of counterterrorism or managing zones of influence. It now views Damascus as a broader strategic confrontation arena with Moscow, exploiting Russia’s reduced ability to maneuver after its war in Ukraine.
The Russian International Affairs Council expert noted that these financial amendments fall within the Trump administration’s clearer policies for changing the Middle East compared with previous administrations.
The US House Armed Services Committee approved, on June 5, a package of amendments linked to the US Department of Defense, Pentagon, budget for Syria, submitted by Republican US Representative Joe Wilson.
The committee required the US Department of Defense to prepare a detailed report to be submitted to the House Armed Services Committee before the end of this year, addressing US plans and efforts to cooperate with the Syrian government to limit Russian influence or work to secure the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Hmeimim air base and Tartus naval base.
The required report includes an assessment of the nature of the role played by Russian bases in Syria, and whether they constitute logistical centers used to transfer weapons or provide support to Iranian proxies in the region.
The amendment also requests a study of potential threats that US forces may face as a result of the Russian presence in Syria, including US forces stationed at the Incirlik base inside Turkish territory.
The provisions also include an assessment of whether Russian bases are used to recruit or transfer fighters from Syria or from African and other countries to participate in the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine.
The report is also expected to address the scale of support provided by Russian forces to the regime of deposed regime head Bashar al-Assad during the war years, and the role of Russian military bases in operations that targeted different Syrian areas.
The Deeper Dimensions of the US Move in Syria
The timing chosen by the United States to begin a phase of reducing Russian influence in Syria raises fundamental questions about Washington’s deeper objectives.
In this context, Lababidi said US concern about the Russian presence in Syria is not new, but is tied to Washington’s complete dissatisfaction with Moscow possessing fixed air and naval bases on the Mediterranean Sea.
Lababidi noted that this step is the first of its kind in modern history, as Russia now has a direct military foothold overlooking Europe’s southern flank. He stressed that this presence strikes at the heart of “European defense theory” because of its extreme proximity to European coasts.
If any confrontation or comprehensive war breaks out, Russia’s military position would be far stronger with these bases on Syrian territory than without them, making the reduction of this influence an urgent security need for NATO.
At the regional level, Lababidi links the current US timing to the repercussions of the latest Iranian military escalation in the region.
According to his analysis, the United States felt a real threat summed up in the possibility that its historical influence in the Middle East could shrink after countries in the region, especially Gulf states, woke up to a shocking truth: Washington had been unable to protect them from Iranian missiles and arrogance, while fully mobilizing in Israel’s favor.
He noted that Washington fully understands that this failure irreversibly changed the rules of the game in the region and pushed Gulf states to reevaluate their strategic relations with Washington. The latter then moved in a surgical attempt to repair American Arab relations, especially with Gulf states.
These financial amendments intersect with a “highly important” strategic timing in the Syrian file. Through it, expert Dmitry Brijeh believes Washington is exploiting Moscow’s preoccupation with Ukraine and its accumulated pressures to reduce its external influence.
Syria is not an isolated file. It is part of a broader equation linked to Israel’s security, Iranian influence, Iraq, the eastern Mediterranean, and energy routes. Weakening Russia there means depriving it of a valuable negotiating card against the West.
Washington’s Less Costly Tools to Besiege Moscow in Syria
According to Brijeh, these shifts reflect the desire of Congress and the US security establishment to rearrange the presence in the Middle East with less costly and more effective tools through three tracks:
- Militarily: consolidating the presence in al-Tanf and the east, supporting local partners, and strengthening training and monitoring programs.
- Economically: imposing targeted sanctions on companies and networks linked to Russian interests in ports, energy, and reconstruction.
- Diplomatically: pressuring Damascus to prevent Moscow from receiving open-ended or long-term privileges.
This approach will reshape local alliances, as Brijeh expects the Syrian Democratic Forces, SDF, to shift from being a military partner against the Islamic State to a negotiating card within a new Syrian security structure, while the al-Tanf factions, the Syrian Free Army, remain a pressure tool in the Badia and along the Iraqi border.
“The American objective shifted from a limited military presence in eastern Syria and al-Tanf to turning this presence into a political, military, and economic pressure tool, to monitor Russia’s movement on the coast, restrict its use of the Hmeimim and Tartus bases in the eastern Mediterranean, and at the same time support local forces to formulate new security arrangements.”
Dmitry Brijeh
Expert at the Russian International Affairs Council
Brijeh considers that Washington is facing a delicate equation to reduce Russian influence without confrontation with Turkey or creating a new internal explosion among Syrian forces.
Brijeh concludes that the realistic American objective at present is not to remove Russia completely in the near term, to avoid a costly confrontation, but to besiege and monitor its presence in Syria, transforming it from a decisive and influential role into a presence with limited impact.
Brijeh also identifies Washington’s red lines in Syria, including exposing its forces to danger, the Russian bases becoming a platform for pressure in the Mediterranean and for transferring weapons to hostile parties, or the Russian bases becoming a platform to pressure American or Atlantic interests in the eastern Mediterranean.
Moscow, by contrast, will read US moves as a policy of strategic encirclement, according to Brijeh. Its response will be to deepen its alliance with Damascus, offer security and economic proposals, use the Security Council, and maneuver internationally by linking the Syrian file to the files of Ukraine, Iran, and energy.
Brijeh considers that successive crises, from the war in Ukraine to the energy and refugee dilemmas, have imposed temporary silence on Europe.
But this silence hides watchfulness, as the continent may join the US move if the new strategy proves capable of limiting Russian influence and protecting the Syrian arena from sliding into new chaos.
Will Syria Become an Arena for Settling International Scores?
The current Syrian scene goes beyond local dimensions, intersecting with a heated international struggle to shape the new global order.
In this framework, Lababidi believes the US move to end the Russian military presence in Syria is governed by Washington’s fears of the stage following the expected decline of its influence in the region, and the expansion of other international powers to fill the vacuum, represented by Russia and driven by rising Chinese influence through massive commercial and economic partnerships with regional states.
Lababidi links this scene to the close alliance between Beijing and Islamabad, as Pakistan recently signed a joint defense treaty with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, translated into the deployment of Pakistani troops on Saudi territory.
Lababidi analyzes this new dynamic by pointing out that Saudi Arabia’s sense of the absence of real American protection pushed it to seek Pakistan’s help in building an alternative safety system.
A Russian military vehicle heads toward the Hmeimim base in Latakia, 15 December 2024 (Reuters)
Damascus Balances Between the Two Poles
The Bases’ Survival Is Governed by Interests
The Syrian government has brought together the two global poles, Russia and the United States, in its foreign diplomatic relations, trying to build a balance between the two competing states, although it has been closer to Washington because of the support shown to the Damascus government, especially lifting sanctions and seeking closer ties with European capitals.
Damascus has not severed its relationship with Moscow. The two sides exchanged visits at different levels, and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa visited Russia twice despite the intertwined files and the nature of the relationship that existed during the era of the former Syrian regime.
Washington, meanwhile, has not hidden its displeasure with the Russian presence in Syria, its new ally, similar to the desire of European capitals to distance Moscow from the Syrian arena.
In this regard, a question arises over the Syrian government’s position on the ongoing debate about the Russian presence on its territory, while it continues to say it is studying its options and the mechanism for the survival of the two bases located in western Syria.
Three Trends
Political researcher Dr. Nader al-Khalil believes there are three main trends in the interpretations, analyses, and discussions taking place in political circles and think tanks.
The first of these trends is that Washington now considers the Russian presence in Syria part of its strategic competition with Moscow, not merely a Syrian file.
This explains the House Armed Services Committee’s request to prepare a report on ways to reduce or end Russian influence.
The second trend holds that Moscow itself is trying to reshape its military presence and negotiate with Damascus on new foundations after the political changes in Syria.
The third trend, meanwhile, confirms that Damascus today has a broader negotiating margin than ever before and no longer handles the file from a position of weakness as it did in the past.
Damascus Seeks Zero Problems
According to researcher al-Khalil, the view closest to reality is that Damascus’s position, if tension escalates between Washington and Moscow, will not be based on siding with either party, but on trying to spare Syria from once again becoming an arena of conflict between major powers.
This aligns with the approach Damascus is trying to establish as a different “necessary equation” based on the principle of “zero problems” and rebuilding the state by prioritizing national interests over involvement in conflict axes.
Russian affairs expert Dr. Nasr al-Youssef said the United States and Europe are not pleased by the presence of two Russian bases in a country where Washington and European capitals want to build good relations, such as Syria, especially with America’s adoption of the new leadership in Syria and the lifting of sanctions on it.
However, he rules out any military tension between Washington and Moscow because of the latter’s bases in Syria.
Enab Baladi conducted a poll on its website to learn followers’ views on the form of the next confrontation between Washington and Moscow in Syria, amid renewed Russian movements on the Syrian coast and US signaling of intervention to curb Russian influence.
Of 1,178 participants in the vote, 477 said there would be no serious confrontation, while 342 leaned toward a race for influence through agreements with the Syrian government. Another 235 expected escalation through sanctions and political pressure, while the remaining share, 124 people, believed events would lead to limited military movements without confrontation.
What Is the Impact of Ignoring US and Western Demands?
Damascus does not view the file of Russian bases from the angle of satisfying Washington or preserving the relationship with Moscow, but from the angle of Syria’s national interest, according to political researcher Dr. Nader al-Khalil. The current Syrian government also appears to be trying to move toward a different policy based on diversifying foreign relations and not being tied to any axis.
Al-Khalil expects Syrian officials to continue seeking balanced relations among all parties, while realizing that entering into a direct confrontation with Russia would carry a political and security cost.
At the same time, fully ignoring US and European demands may affect the economic and political opening opportunities the country needs in the reconstruction phase.
“It is clear so far that Damascus is not seeking to end the Russian presence merely because there is an American or European desire for that, but at the same time it does not want it to remain as it was before.”
Dr. Nader al-Khalil
Political researcher
The Syrian interest lies in possessing freedom of decision and investing this file as a “negotiating card” with different parties, in a way that serves its “highest priority” issues of reconstruction, lifting sanctions, and restoring stability. It also lies in ensuring that Syria does not become part of the American policy and axis of containing Russia, or a platform for Russian competition with the West.
What Is the Future of the Russian Bases?
Russian affairs expert al-Youssef expects an agreement to keep the Russian bases, but with a ban on using them as military tools that could harm European security. He noted that the general direction of the Syrian government has shifted toward neutrality.
He said that when the two bases were established, their uses were military, as they could be located on the soft flank of the European Union.
Now, after the change that took place in Syria, their use has become, as Russian President Vladimir Putin and his foreign minister Sergey Lavrov had previously announced, for humanitarian purposes, with some uses for commercial activities, he said.
He explained that Russia has interests in Africa, especially after African states “expelled” France and turned toward Moscow, and that these bases could be used for logistical purposes: “Moscow, Hmeimim, Africa.”
He added that the base in Tartus would return to the uses it had before the fall of the former Syrian regime, civilian and logistical, as it had been a point for refueling, repair, food supplies, and other needs.
The entrance to Russia’s Hmeimim air base in Syria in a photo dated 29 December 2024 (AFP, Aref Watad)
Priority to Sovereignty
Political researcher Dr. Nader al-Khalil told Enab Baladi that the future of the Russian bases will not be decided according to an American decision or a Russian desire.
He believes the file is linked to the extent to which Damascus can impose “a new approach” that subjects the fate of any foreign military presence to its national priorities and to what achieves state sovereignty.
The Syrian leadership’s success in managing this balance would be a gain, transforming this file from a source of external pressure into a “negotiating power card” in a way that achieves national interests, away from axes politics and international polarization.
Al-Khalil called for linking the presence of any foreign military bases to Syria’s interest and sovereignty, and for that presence to be governed by clear agreements that are limited in time and function, away from the effects and arrangements imposed by the conditions of war.
Here, Damascus can work to review the agreements with Moscow and reduce some forms of its military presence or restructure and redeploy it, without necessarily meaning its immediate end, according to al-Khalil.
Al-Khalil said this is what Moscow’s stated readiness to discuss restructuring its military presence is paving the way for.
The Golan for Russian Bases, Damascus’s Difficult Equation
The head of the Syria office at the Syrian American Council, Dr. Zaki Lababidi, believes that dismantling Russian bases in Syria is a complex issue that cannot be achieved for free. He stressed that meeting the American desire to remove this military presence requires clear conditions.
These conditions begin with the US administration’s ability to provide real guarantees to the Syrian government confirming its commitment and actual ability to rein in Netanyahu and successive Israeli governments, and to prevent them from targeting Syrian territory and citizens.
In this context, Lababidi noted that Damascus’s approach to the Russian file is governed by more precise calculations. Despite the prevailing popular and historical negative view among Syrians toward the Russian role and Moscow’s military behavior, the current government views the Russian bases as a necessary tool to create “balance in international relations,” specifically to neutralize the Israeli threat.
Lababidi pointed out that current developments include ongoing talk of deploying Russian forces on Syria’s southern border to reduce Israeli incursions and skirmishes.
Damascus realizes that Washington does not have the will or ability to force Israel to withdraw. Strengthening relations with Moscow therefore gives the Russian side a strong pressure card to slow Israeli operations in southern Syria.
According to his own analysis, Lababidi considers the fixed political truth to be that “liberating the Golan” is the only condition under which the Syrian government could officially accept the removal of Russian air and naval bases from its territory.
This proposition, in his view, represents the “most valuable winning card” Damascus possesses in its indirect negotiations with Washington, as it places the US administration before a real test of how serious it is about bringing comprehensive peace to Syria and the region.
“The absence of the historical counterpart represented by the return of the Golan, and the guarantees tied to it, will make removing Russian bases from Syria extremely complicated, indeed impossible, under the current balance of power. The ball is now entirely in the American court to measure the extent of Washington’s readiness to pay this price in exchange for removing Moscow from the eastern Mediterranean.”
Zaki Lababidi
Head of the Syria office at the Syrian American Council
The post How Is Damascus Balancing Relations With Washington and Moscow? appeared first on Enab Baladi.