Amir Hakouk | Mohammad Deeb Bazat | Yazan Kur
One year after the events of July 2025, Suwayda (southern Syria) is still confronting the consequences of a crisis that extended beyond security confrontations to affect the political landscape, public services, and the pursuit of justice and accountability.
Although the intensity of the clashes has declined and some institutions and services have partially resumed their work, displacement, weak infrastructure, multiple centers of influence, and an ongoing crisis of trust remain major challenges in the governorate.
Over the past year, political initiatives have been proposed, local bodies have been formed, and a national investigative committee has been launched. However, efforts toward a solution and recovery have continued to face internal complications and regional entanglements, amid continuing debate over the governorate’s future and the mechanisms required to restore stability.
This report examines conditions in Suwayda one year after the events through three main themes. The first addresses political and security changes and the factors shaping the crisis. The second reviews the pursuit of justice and accountability and the questions and challenges surrounding it. The third examines services and living conditions, including the partial recovery achieved and the crises that continue to affect residents’ daily lives.
Politically, No Solutions and Overlapping Local and Foreign Interests
The Suwayda crisis is no longer merely a security issue associated with intermittent clashes or local disputes. It has become one of the most complex issues in Syria’s transitional period.
Although confrontations have declined compared with the first months after the events, the roots of the crisis remain. These include a lack of trust between the state and part of the local community, multiple decision-making centers, the spread of weapons, slow progress toward political solutions, and the continuing influence of regional and international actors.
Several initiatives were proposed over the past months, most notably a road map announced under Syrian, Jordanian, and US sponsorship. The governorate also witnessed the formation of local councils and bodies, but none of these steps succeeded in ending the deadlock, leaving Suwayda in a situation where political, security, and social issues remain deeply intertwined.
Teachers protest in Suwayda city to demand payment of their salaries, October 2, 2025. (Suwayda 24)
The Suwayda Events
The events in Suwayda began on July 12, 2025, after reciprocal kidnappings involving residents of the predominantly Bedouin al-Maqous neighborhood in Suwayda and members of the Druze community. The incidents developed into armed clashes the following day.
The Syrian government intervened on July 14 to end the conflict, but its intervention was accompanied by violations against Druze civilians. This prompted local factions to respond, including groups that had been cooperating with the Ministries of Defense and Interior.
Government forces withdrew from Suwayda on July 16 after being targeted by Israeli strikes. Violations and retaliatory acts against Bedouin residents of the governorate followed, prompting military convoys described as “tribal mobilizations” to enter in their support.
From Security Tensions to an Open Crisis
Despite their differing perspectives, experts agree that the July events changed the nature of the crisis in Suwayda, transforming it from local protests and tensions into a political crisis extending beyond the governorate.
Dr. Samir al-Abdullah, a senior researcher at the Arab Center for Contemporary Syrian Studies, said Suwayda had become a “complex political knot” reflecting the nature of Syria’s transitional period. He explained that the crisis was no longer limited to security, but also involved a trust crisis between the state and part of the local community, a crisis of local representation, the spread of weapons, and foreign intervention.
Al-Abdullah told Enab Baladi that reducing the situation to a confrontation between the state and groups operating outside its authority did not reflect reality. The scene includes armed local forces that developed their own narrative of the July events, a central authority that, in his view, has failed to produce an inclusive political discourse capable of reassuring the governorate’s residents and rebuilding trust, and foreign actors seeking to use Suwayda as a bargaining card in regional negotiations.
“Reducing the situation to a confrontation between the state and groups operating outside its authority does not reflect reality,”
Dr. Samir al-Abdullah
Senior researcher at the Arab Center for Contemporary Syrian Studies
Ammar Jallo, a researcher at the Washington-based Dialogue Center for Research and Studies, told Enab Baladi that Suwayda entered a state of political isolation after the events. He said it had become hostage to a de facto authority that obstructed opportunities for understanding with Damascus, as personal considerations, ideological positions, and political ambitions came to dominate the public scene.
Kenan Masoud, media spokesperson for the Third Current, said the July events exposed the scale of the political and institutional vacuum in the governorate and demonstrated the fragility of the relationship between society and the state. He stressed that Suwayda could not be viewed as a region separate from Syria.
Masoud told Enab Baladi that the governorate should not be reduced to choices between separation, accusations of treason, or the imposition of a de facto order. Instead, it should be part of a national project based on a just state, effective institutions, genuine administrative decentralization, and accountability for everyone involved in violations.
A Struggle Over the Legitimacy of Arms and Sovereignty
Although the level of escalation has declined compared with the period immediately after the July events, sporadic clashes between internal security forces and the National Guard continue.
Al-Abdullah said these clashes reflected a dispute over the legitimacy of weapons and sovereignty. The state insists on its right to monopolize force and impose security, while local forces present themselves as protectors of the community following the July events. This means the conflict extends beyond its military dimensions and reflects a disagreement over the nature of authority and who possesses sovereignty.
Jallo said the clashes confirmed the continuing rupture between Damascus and the de facto authority in Suwayda. However, he did not expect them to develop into a broader conflict, saying the crisis had entered a stage of “freezing.”
Local Councils Between Filling the Vacuum and Multiple Authorities
In the absence of a clear government vision for the governorate’s future, several local councils and bodies emerged during the past year and attempted to administer certain affairs.
Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri formed a “legal committee,” which was later dissolved and replaced by the Mount Bashan Administration Council. The Third Current was also established as a civil grouping and third party between the government and local actors. Experts, however, remain divided over the role of these bodies.
Al-Abdullah said the formation of these councils reflected an attempt to fill the political and administrative vacuum created by the crisis. At the same time, he said they carried risks in the absence of a government discourse explaining its vision for the governorate’s future.
Masoud distinguished between civic and political activity, saying it was natural and necessary for society to organize itself through civil groupings after decades in which political life had been suppressed.
However, he criticized what he described as attempts to impose bodies that monopolize decision-making and represent specific agendas. In his view, this made them closer to tools for containing society and imposing decisions upon it than institutions representing the governorate’s different segments.
Jallo linked the decline in civil society’s effectiveness to the dominance of the de facto authority. He said civil institutions that played a prominent role after the fall of the former regime had gradually lost influence because personal interests and political ambitions were prioritized. This weakened the local community’s ability to produce independent initiatives for addressing the crisis.
Stalled Solutions Amid Conflicting Interests and Lost Trust
One year after the events, the crisis does not appear close to a political settlement despite international involvement.
The announcement of a road map under Jordanian and US sponsorship was one of the most significant political developments following the July events.
The road map included several urgent measures, most notably:
- The Syrian government would invite the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry to investigate the events in Suwayda.
- All perpetrators of violations would be held accountable under Syrian law.
- Humanitarian and medical assistance would continue to enter the governorate.
- Qualified police forces would be deployed along the Suwayda-Damascus road to secure civilian and commercial movement.
However, the road map failed to produce a genuine breakthrough on the ground, and experts differed in their explanations for its failure.
Al-Abdullah attributed the failure of the international initiative to the differing priorities of foreign powers. Jordan views the issue primarily through the lens of border security, while the United States focuses on preventing escalation and arranging security conditions in southern Syria. Meanwhile, he said, the Syrian government remained unable to launch a political initiative capable of restoring trust.
He added that the road map included provisions on accountability, security, and the return of displaced people, but lacked implementation guarantees and monitoring mechanisms. It also faced deep mistrust between the parties and continuing foreign intervention, which limited its effectiveness.
Dr. Kenan Masoud said the southern Syria file had largely moved beyond the domestic Syrian framework and become part of broader regional arrangements. He said the Israel-Iran war had further complicated those arrangements, freezing the situation and postponing direct solutions.
Masoud linked the road map’s failure to the transformation of southern Syria into part of wider security and regional negotiations involving Israel’s border security and arrangements along the southern front. This left implementation dependent on understandings that had not yet matured.
Israeli Intervention, Pressure Tactic or Strategic Project?
Experts view Israel’s role as one of the most influential factors behind the continuation of the crisis, particularly because Tel Aviv intervened militarily from the beginning of the events under the stated justification of protecting Syria’s Druze community.
Al-Abdullah said Israel had treated Suwayda as a regional pressure card, using the slogan of protecting the Druze to keep southern Syria in a state of fragility and prevent the emergence of a strong Syrian authority near its borders.
Jallo went further, saying Israeli intervention was connected to a shift in Israel’s security doctrine after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. In his view, Israel is seeking to expand buffer zones in southern Syria while exploiting the claim that it is protecting the Druze community.
He also warned that reliance on foreign protection remained subject to changing international interests, citing previous Syrian experiences in which supporting powers changed their positions when political circumstances shifted.
“Israel is seeking to expand buffer zones in southern Syria while exploiting the claim that it is protecting the Druze community,”
Ammar Jallo
Researcher at the Washington-based Dialogue Center for Research and Studies.
Masoud said Israel was using certain voices and slogans associated with protecting the Druze to serve its goal of weakening Syria’s social fabric. He stressed that the governorate should not become a tool in regional projects.
Protesters gather in al-Karama Square in Suwayda city during a demonstration under the slogan “Victims’ Families,” April 11, 2026. (Enab Baladi)
Services, How Has Life in Suwayda Changed?
The July 2025 events transformed daily life in Suwayda after causing widespread infrastructure damage and a major wave of displacement, pushing public services into one of their most severe crises in recent years.
Since the attack on the governorate on July 13, 2025, residents have faced water and electricity cuts, shortages of bread and fuel, closures of main roads, and reduced access to humanitarian supplies. One year later, some services have partially resumed and several sectors have improved compared with the first months. However, the recovery remains incomplete, and the effects of displacement, weak infrastructure, and the cost-of-living crisis continue to shape residents’ lives.
Water, The Most Complex Crisis
The water sector suffered the greatest damage. Dozens of wells went out of service, most notably the al-Thaala well complex, which had supplied between 60% and 70% of Suwayda city’s drinking water.
According to an earlier statement by the Water Establishment to Enab Baladi, the main station in al-Thaala was burned and vandalized. Another 98 wells throughout the governorate also went out of service, causing the pumping system to collapse during the first days.
To alleviate the crisis, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent distributed hundreds of water tanks, while local organizations implemented projects to operate some wells using solar energy.
Despite these efforts, the crisis continued. Fewer than half of the wells supplying the city returned to operation, while the highest-producing wells remained out of service. This reduced water production to less than one-quarter of daily demand. Solar energy projects were implemented in recent months to operate wells in several villages, but they did not fully resolve the crisis.
Electricity, Limited Improvement
The electricity sector suffered widespread damage after transformer stations and supply lines were targeted. During the period following the events, electricity was available for no more than two hours a day, followed by approximately 20 hours of outages. The main 230-kilovolt line went out of service, forcing the governorate to rely on the 66-kilovolt backup line until late 2025.
The effects extended across different sectors, affecting water pumping stations, hospitals, health centers, and bakeries. Although supply has improved compared with the siege period, long rationing hours continue to affect residents’ daily lives.
Bread, From Crisis to Relative Stability
Suwayda needs approximately 120 metric tons of flour each day. However, the quantities delivered during the siege were far lower because the Umm al-Zaytun mills were not operating and humanitarian convoys were delayed.
The governorate relied at the time on flour supplied by the World Food Programme through Syrian Arab Red Crescent convoys. However, the crisis returned after the program’s contract ended in September 2025, causing bakeries to stop operating and raising the price of an unsubsidized bread bundle to approximately 20,000 Syrian pounds. Many residents were forced to depend on commercially baked or homemade bread.
As flour began entering through government channels and distribution was organized locally, lines at bakeries declined and bread became more available in most neighborhoods.
Reopening Roads Ended Isolation but Began a Price Crisis
During the first weeks after the events, Suwayda experienced near-total isolation after the Damascus-Suwayda road was closed and commercial traffic stopped. This caused severe shortages of food, medicine, and fuel, along with sharp price increases.
When the road gradually reopened in late August 2025, humanitarian and later commercial convoys began entering. Markets again received basic goods, several public service institutions resumed work, and fuel became available for bakeries, hospitals, and water stations.
However, reopening the roads did not end the cost-of-living crisis. Instead, the problem shifted from shortages to high prices, which continue to affect residents.
A member of the Syrian security forces near the entrance to Suwayda city, July 15, 2025. (AFP)
Displacement, Continuing Consequences
Displacement was among the harshest consequences of the July events. More than 170,000 people were forced to leave their homes, according to UN estimates, while local statistics documented approximately 192,000 people affected.
Most families moved toward Suwayda city, Shahba, Salkhad, and several relatively safe villages. At the height of the crisis, the number of collective shelters exceeded 90, hosting more than 1,700 families.
The number of people living in the centers declined over time, but the crisis did not end. A total of 1,212 families remain in 75 centers distributed across the city and its countryside.
Housing and Shelters Amid Declining Support
At first, displaced families depended on community initiatives and local donations. Humanitarian organizations, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, and the church later intervened to provide food, water, bedding, and basic supplies, as well as field kitchens.
Assistance gradually declined as funding decreased and some organizations shifted their attention to other areas.
Managers of the centers said many families were now relying on their limited resources to secure food. Cooking supplies, gas, and hygiene products created additional burdens, alongside shortages of infant formula, nutritional supplements, and medication for chronic illnesses.
The arrival of thousands of families in Suwayda city over a short period placed heavy pressure on a real estate market that already suffered from limited housing availability.
Monthly rents rose above 1.5 million Syrian pounds in some cases, while furnished apartments cost more than 2 million pounds, according to monitoring conducted by Enab Baladi.
Tenants also complained that landlords demanded advance payments and large security deposits, while finding suitable housing became more difficult than ever.
Salaries and Income, Limited Relief
The events also affected sources of income. The shutdown of financial institutions and automated teller machines deprived many employees and pensioners of their salaries during the first months, while prices continued to rise.
Many families relied on borrowing or remittances from relatives abroad. During 2026, signs of gradual relief appeared as salary payments resumed for several groups of public-sector employees and temporary contract workers. Some substitute teachers also received delayed payments after waiting for months.
Markets, Available Goods but Weak Purchasing Power
Markets have recovered a significant part of their activity, and most basic goods returned to shelves after months of shortages.
However, the main problem is no longer the availability of goods, but weak purchasing power and a shortage of cash. Residents said vegetables and food were available, but every purchase required careful calculation. Meat had disappeared from the tables of many families.
Some construction materials and electrical equipment also experienced recurring shortages because of high transportation costs and exchange-rate fluctuations.
The main arterial road in Suwayda governorate, April 23, 2026. (Enab Baladi)
Education, Continuing Challenges
Education was one of the sectors most affected by the events. Classes were suspended for weeks, and some schools were converted into shelters, interrupting the education of thousands of students and delaying completion of the curriculum.
Secondary school certificate students were the most affected after their examinations were suspended. A replacement examination session was organized in November 2025, and its results were announced in February 2026, but the official recognition of the certificates remained unresolved.
As the 2026 examinations approached, a decision to transfer examination centers for Suwayda students to Damascus and its countryside provoked local objections over security risks and financial burdens. Suwayda governorate later announced that it was prepared to provide transportation and accommodation for students taking examinations outside the governorate.
Governorate Says Security Conditions Obstruct Services
The Suwayda governorate media office told Enab Baladi that the Syrian government was working to rehabilitate infrastructure and improve public services. It said reconstruction had included areas in the northern and western countryside, where rehabilitation work in several villages had been fully completed.
The governorate added that the government was continuing to supply public institutions with the necessary equipment and services and had strategic plans to improve public services.
It attributed the main obstacles to restoring services to instability in some areas caused by groups it described as “outlaws.” It said their presence obstructed the work of institutions and delayed the return of services to normal levels.
Regarding education, the governorate said the challenges were not limited to staff, buildings, or examinations, but were also connected to security conditions. It cited an incident in which the Education Directorate was stormed and its newly appointed director was forced to resign.
The governorate also said residents’ demands focused on restoring security and limiting theft and vandalism affecting water facilities, wells, and telecommunications networks, all of which disrupted the continuity of services.
It denied that authorities were obstructing the entry of food supplies, fuel, or flour into Suwayda. It said all materials entered after the completion of legal inspection procedures and that coordination with local actors and community committees took place through the relevant government institutions.
A roadside fuel stall in Suwayda, April 20, 2026. (Enab Baladi)
One Year Later, What Is the Way Out?
Despite differing diagnoses, the experts agreed that continuing the current situation did not constitute a solution and that overcoming the crisis required an approach extending beyond security measures toward a broader political and social process.
Al-Abdullah called for recognition of the grievances arising from the July events, publication of the investigation results, accountability for those responsible for violations, and guarantees of the return of displaced people. He also called for genuine local administration and for weapons to be brought under disciplined institutions within the state. He said Suwayda represented a test of the new Syria’s ability to build a state based on justice and national partnership.
Jallo said a solution required ending the existing rupture and identifying genuine representatives of the local community who could enter dialogue with the state. He also called on Damascus to become more open to Syria’s social diversity.
Masoud said addressing the crisis must begin with recognition of the scale of the humanitarian tragedy caused by the events. He called for transparent accountability for everyone involved in violations, compensation for victims, and the safe return of displaced people from all communities. He said local understandings should be rebuilt on the basis that Suwayda is part of the Syrian state and that its stability can only be achieved within a state governed by law and institutions, away from projects of division or attempts to impose a de facto order.
Legally, Justice Remains Under Examination
Syrian authorities took several legal steps during the past year, beginning with the formation of a national committee to investigate the Suwayda events, followed by an extension of its mandate and the announcement that several cases had been referred to the judiciary.
On July 3, 2026, the committee announced that the Military Criminal Court in Damascus had begun holding public trial sessions on July 1 after several defendants were referred to an investigating judge. It said the proceedings were being conducted according to legal procedures and fair trial guarantees.
The announcement that trials had begun as the first anniversary of the events approached raised questions about the significance of the timing, whether the investigations were complete, and whether the trials represented the genuine beginning of a comprehensive justice process capable of holding all responsible parties accountable and providing redress to victims.
Key Milestones of the Suwayda Investigation Committee
- July 31, 2025: The Ministry of Justice issued Decision No. 1287 establishing a national committee to investigate the Suwayda events, determine their circumstances, identify those responsible for violations, and refer them to the judiciary.
- March 17, 2026: The committee submitted its final report to the Minister of Justice after an investigation lasting several months. The report documented the sequence of events between July 11 and July 20, 2025, counted the dead, wounded, missing, and displaced, and identified parties responsible for violations.
- It cited the responsibility of multiple parties, including members of the Ministries of Defense and Interior, local armed groups, and tribal gunmen. It recommended referring all those involved to the judiciary, protecting mass grave sites, providing reparations to victims, strengthening community reconciliation, and collecting unlicensed weapons.
- July 3, 2026: The committee announced that several defendants had been referred to the judiciary and that the Military Criminal Court in Damascus had begun holding public trial sessions on July 1.
A Process Lacking Independence and Completeness
Based on these developments, Bassam al-Ahmad, executive director of Syrians for Truth and Justice, said the national investigation into the Suwayda events remained “deficient and incomplete” and suffered from a lack of transparency and independence. He said an investigation into events of this magnitude should be conducted by an independent body, not by an authority accused of responsibility for some of the violations.
Al-Ahmad told Enab Baladi that the Syrian government’s formation of the investigative committee raised concerns about impartiality. He said one of the most serious shortcomings was the committee’s inability to reach all victims, particularly in areas where large numbers of Druze residents were killed by members of the Ministries of Defense and Interior and tribal gunmen, according to him.
He added that limited access to some areas had affected the completeness of the investigation, compared with the coastal violence, where the investigative committee had broader field access, although concerns had also been raised about its conclusions.
Trials Are a First Step, but Success Depends on Full Accountability
Legal researcher Al-Moutassim al-Kilani said transferring the Suwayda file from investigation to judicial referral was, in principle, a positive development. It indicated that investigators had moved beyond collecting information and reached a stage where charges could be brought against several suspects.
Al-Kilani told Enab Baladi that the launch of the first public trials of defendants accused of serious violations during July reflected a willingness not to allow those violations to pass without accountability. However, he said the seriousness of the step should not be assessed merely by the opening of trials, but by their adherence to standards of justice and the rule of law.
Genuine accountability, he added, would be measured by whether investigations covered all violations and everyone responsible for them, regardless of their position or affiliation. It would also require judicial independence, respect for victims’ rights, public proceedings, opportunities for victims to participate in the legal process, and reparations for the harm they suffered.
He said the developments represented the beginning of a justice process, not its conclusion. Its success would depend on independent judicial rulings and confirmation that no party proven responsible had been excluded.
A protest in Suwayda demanding the right to self-determination, April 11, 2026. (Enab Baladi)
Political Considerations More Than Legal Ones
Regarding the coincidence between the announcement of judicial proceedings and the anniversary of the events, al-Ahmad said the timing was probably linked more to political considerations than to the completion of the legal process.
He said the authorities had previously adopted a similar approach to the coastal violence by using judicial measures to send messages abroad that accountability procedures were taking place. Al-Ahmad said the main challenge extended beyond the investigation itself and began with the mechanism used to form the committee. Any independent investigation, he said, would classify violations according to the parties responsible, whether they were committed by forces affiliated with the Ministries of Defense and Interior, Druze groups that targeted Arab tribes, or tribal groups that carried out later attacks.
He added that the most dangerous consequence of the events was the social rift between the Druze community and Arab tribes.
Al-Ahmad described the violations accompanying the events as including “massacres and serious violations.” He said some incidents might contain indications requiring an investigation into possible crimes against humanity or crimes targeting people based on their sectarian identity. Such allegations, he added, required an independent and comprehensive investigation capable of determining the legal classification of each incident.
“It remains possible to address the consequences of the events if there is genuine political will based on acknowledging mistakes, holding those responsible accountable, revealing the truth, and compensating victims.”
Bassam al-Ahmad
Executive director of Syrians for Truth and Justice
Timing Alone Does Not Determine Seriousness
Al-Kilani said the delay could be legally justified if the investigative committee needed time to complete evidence collection, verify testimony, and prepare coherent prosecution files, particularly in cases involving large numbers of victims, incidents, and defendants.
“The announcement that trials had begun around the first anniversary may send a message that accountability measures are continuing, but it does not by itself prove their effectiveness,”
Al-Moutassim al-Kilani
Legal expert with expertise in human rights and international criminal law
He added that the legal value of the proceedings did not depend on the timing of the announcement, but on judicial independence, trial transparency, the possibility of monitoring proceedings, and implementation of the rulings.
Limited Access Does Not Invalidate an Investigation
Regarding the committee’s reliance on testimony and evidence collected remotely in some areas, al-Kilani said investigators’ inability to reach every site did not automatically invalidate the investigation.
Modern criminal investigation standards and international practices permit the use of multiple forms of evidence, including witness testimony, video recordings, satellite imagery, medical reports, and digital evidence, provided they are subjected to judicial verification.
He added that using such evidence created challenges related to establishing authenticity, maintaining a proper chain of custody, and allowing it to be challenged before a court. These issues could affect its legal weight without necessarily making it inadmissible.
The strength of the prosecution file, he said, would be determined by the consistency and integration of the evidence, witness hearings, and the necessary technical expertise, in accordance with international standards for investigating serious human rights violations.
Justice Is Not Limited to Criminal Accountability
Al-Kilani said comparative experiences in transitional justice showed that criminal accountability was one pillar of justice, but not the only one.
Providing redress to victims required an integrated system that fully established the truth, conducted independent and fair trials, and provided reparations through compensation, restoration of rights, and rehabilitation. It also required guarantees of non-recurrence through institutional reform, stronger oversight and accountability, and the participation of victims in judicial proceedings.
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